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Between Commerce and Empire: 
David Hume, Colonial Slavery, and Commercial Incivility1 
  
Abstract 
Eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought has recently been reclaimed as a robust, albeit 
short-lived, cosmopolitan critique of European imperialism. This essay complicates this 
interpretation through a study of David Hume’s reflections on commerce, empire, and 
slavery. I argue that while Hume condemned the colonial system of monopoly, war, and 
conquest, his strictures against empire did not extend to colonial slavery in the Atlantic. 
This was because colonial slavery represented a manifestly uncivil institution when judged 
by enlightened metropolitan sensibilities, yet also a decisively commercial institution 
pivotal to the eighteenth-century global economy. Confronted by the paradoxical 
“commercial incivility” of modern slavery, Hume opted for disavowing the link between 
slavery and commerce, and confined his criticism of slavery to its ancient, feudal, and 
Asiatic incarnations. I contend that Hume’s disavowal of the commercial barbarism of the 
Atlantic economy is part of a broader ideological effort to separate the idea of commerce 
from its imperial origins and posit it as the liberal antithesis of empire. The implications of 
analysis, I conclude, go beyond the eighteenth-century debates over commerce and empire, 
and more generally pertain to the contradictory entwinement of liberalism and capitalism. 
Keywords: liberalism, empire, capitalism, colonialism, slavery, commerce, 
Enlightenment, David Hume, Adam Smith 
 
Introduction 
One of the more remarkable recent reorientations in the field of political theory has 
been the “imperial turn.”2 Especially amongst the scholars of intellectual history, the 
entanglement of modern Western political thought with the history of European 
colonialism is now a half-truism,3 although disagreement abounds over the extent, 
significance, and contemporary implications of such entanglements.4 The debate has been 
particularly vivid when the political ideas or thinkers under study are associated with 
																																																								
1 Onur Ulas Ince, Singapore Management University. E-mail: ulasince@smu.edu.sg. 
2 For an overview, see J. Pitts, ‘Theories of Empire and Imperialism,’ Annual Review of Political Science, 13 
(2010) pp. 211-35. 
3 See especially the essays recently collected in S. Muthu (ed.) Empire and Modern Political Thought 
(Cambridge, 2012). For the intersection of imperial history and theories of international relations, see D. 
Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge, 2013). 
4 For a useful recent appraisal, see D. Bell, ‘The Dream Machine: On Liberalism and Empire,’ in Remaking 
the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, 2016). 
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“liberalism” or the “Enlightenment,” as these intellectual traditions are ostensibly 
incompatible with relations of domination and subjugation inherent in modern empires.5 A 
major touchstone for testing these traditions’ intermixture with imperial agendas has been 
to interrogate the arguments of (proto)liberal European thinkers regarding the legal and 
cultural status of non-Europeans, as well as their judgments on Europeans’ treatment of 
non-Europeans in the context of imperial expansion. Theories of universalism and 
relativism, pluralism and provincialism, and cosmopolitanism and exceptionalism furnish 
these investigations with their principal objects of inquiry in charting out the courses of 
collusion and collision between modern European political thought and colonialism. 
This essay pursues a promising yet relatively underserved line of inquiry into this 
field, one that adopts as its central optic the political economy of empire. Parting with the 
dominant preoccupation with European representations of the non-Europeans, it aims to 
bring into focus European thinkers’ perceptions of their fellow Europeans as agents of 
distinctly modern and commercially driven acts of conquest, plunder, and enslavement. At 
the center of my analysis is the status of coercive economic enterprises at imperial frontiers 
as a theoretical problem to be negotiated and judged by metropolitan standards of 
liberalism, civility, and enlightenment.6 While a comprehensive triangulation of this 
problem exceeds the space of this essay, I suggest that a productive starting point is offered 
																																																								
5 For starkly contrasting positions on liberalism’s relationship to empire, see U. Mehta, Liberalism and 
Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999) and J. Pitts, A Turn to 
Empire: The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005). 
6 My interpretation is therefore concerned less with what Europeans thought of who the colonized were than 
with their views on what the colonizers did, though this is not to overlook that answers given to these 
questions historically mediated one another. An exemplary and rather controversial case is Edmund Burke’s 
differential treatment of Indians, Africans, and Native Americans. See Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, 
chapter 5; Pitts, Turn to Empire, chapter 3; M. Kohn and D. O’Neill, ‘A Tale of Two Indias: Burke and Mill 
on Empire and Slavery in the West Indies and America,’ Political Theory, 34 (2006), pp. 192-228. 
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by the works of David Hume, the Scottish Enlightenment luminary, champion of modern 
commercial civility, and forerunner of classical political economy. Hume’s writings on 
commerce and empire provide us with a window onto the challenges posed to metropolitan 
conceptions of commercial civility by imperial instantiations of commercial incivility in 
the eighteenth-century. I contend that colonial plantation slavery in particular confronted 
Hume with a thorny conundrum, as it constituted at once a powerful engine of global 
commerce and an uncivil institution that contravened the conventions of modern European 
civility that global commerce had made possible. I trace this conundrum through a series 
of elisions that traverse Hume’s writings on slavery, liberty, and despotism. I maintain that 
Hume treated slavery as a principally moral and political problem, disavowing its economic 
centrality to the modern world of global commerce. This took the form of diverting 
attention from the modern, commercial incarnation of slavery (the colonial-capitalist 
plantation), and confining the discussion of this practice almost exclusively to its ancient, 
feudal, or Asiatic variants. The implications of this analysis, I argue, more broadly concern 
the separation of the idea of global commerce from the imperial institutional framework 
within which it came into existence, and its idealization as the very foundation of a liberal 
critique of empire. 
The essay proceeds in four sections. I begin by framing the problem of commercial 
incivility as a problem of the illiberal origins of global commerce, expressed in the 
relationship between the “gentlemanly capitalists” and the “imperial frontiersmen” of the 
British Empire. The second section reconstructs Hume’s celebratory account of the 
constitutive link between commerce and civility that set modern Europeans apart both from 
ancient Europeans and contemporary non-Europeans. The third section turns to Hume’s 
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criticism of the “old colonial system” of mercantilist regulations and trade monopolies, and 
delineates the difficulties involved in disentangling the idea of commerce as a civilizing 
force from the objectionable imperial economic relations in and through which it 
historically came into existence. As a condensation point of this conundrum, the final 
section concentrates on Hume’s writings on slavery and places them in conversation with 
Adam Smith’s arguments on the same subject in order to tease out Hume’s rhetorical 
moves that deflect attention from the disturbing “commercial incivility” of the modern 
plantation economy. The conclusion extends the analysis in two directions. First, I propose 
that the figure of the imperial frontiersman complicates the civic humanist account of the 
origins of liberalism as a political language, as espoused by J. G. A. Pocock. Second, I 
conjecture that the fraught entwinement of commerce and empire in the early modern 
period can offer insights into the contradictory entwinement of liberalism and capitalism 
more generally. 
 
I. Imperial Frontiersmen, Gentlemanly Capitalists 
A prominent interpretive strand in the literature on liberalism and empire has 
stressed the “deep ambivalence” harbored by eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers 
on the question of global commerce. For instance, Sankar Muthu has argued that the 
enthusiasm about the cosmopolitan potential of global commerce for peace, prosperity, and 
civilization was marred by skepticism towards the imperial processes of “violence, 
exploitation, slavery, conquest, and occupation” by which such global connections were 
forged.7 In a similar vein, Jennifer Pitts has claimed that Hume’s generation was “the first 																																																								
7 S. Muthu, ‘Conquest, Commerce, and Cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment Political Thought,’ in Muthu 
(ed), Empire and Modern Political Thought, p. 205. For a similar interpretation, see A. Pagden, ““Savage 
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to try to come to grips with the idea that Europe did not give birth to itself: that modern 
Europe was constituted by its global connections”; however, 
Enlightenment historians were struck by the irony that this cosmopolitan existence had 
been brought about through conquests they could only consider barbaric in their violence. 
… there was not global history to be written before 1492, and afterward, the only global 
history to be written had to take account of the brutality, chaos, and expropriation 
characteristic of European empires.8 
 
These interpretations have served to complicate the totalizing postcolonial critique of 
Enlightenment thought as an unequivocal and uniform ideology of imperial rule. 
Eighteenth-century Enlightenment in particular has been shown to be capable of a robust 
moral critique of imperial violence and injustice at the same time it embraced the 
cosmopolitan promise of the new commercial order. 
At first glance, the problem of “commercial incivility” would appear to be a species 
of the aforementioned “ambivalence” or “irony” of global commerce. I suggest, however, 
that a more fruitful way of approaching this problem is to cast it in terms of the illiberal 
imperial origins of capitalism and its liberal metropolitan conceptions. There exists a long-
standing and freshly revitalized strand of scholarship that centers on the formative role of 
European imperial violence in the historical creation of global capitalist structures.9 The 
displacement of the indigenous peoples in the Americas, the slave trade and plantations in 
the Atlantic, armed “company capitalism” in South and Southeast Asia, and various forms 
of resource extraction and “export-led exploitation” have been examined as chief moments 
																																																								
Impulse-Civilized Calculation”: Conquest, Commerce, and the Enlightenment Critique of Empire,” in The 
Burdens of Empire: 1539 to the Present (Cambridge, 2015). 
8 J. Pitts, ‘The Global in Enlightenment Historical Thought,’ in P. Duara, V. Murthy, A. Sartori (eds), A 
Companion to Global Historical Thought (Chichester, 2014), pp. 185, 189. 
9 For a theoretical treatment of the “colonial empire” as the politico-legal framework of the historical 
emergence of capitalism, see O. Ince, “Primitive Accumulation, New Enclosures, and Global Land Grabs: A 
Theoretical Intervention,” Rural Sociology 79 (2014), pp. 104-131. 
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in the history of global capital.10 Writing in this vein, Sven Beckert has recently concluded, 
“not secure private property rights but a wave of expropriation of labor and land 
characterized this moment, testifying to capitalism’s illiberal origins.”11 At the same time, 
these coercive processes of social transformation gave birth to the institutional background 
conditions of capitalism, such as private property in productive assets, global commodity 
chains, markets in subsistence goods, and mobile wage labor, around which arose a liberal 
understanding of capitalism as a market system based on contractual relations and the 
investment of capital. Classical political economy, from Hume onwards, designated these 
juridico-economic forms as the defining features of the new commercial-capitalist order 
and strove to distinguish this order from the imperial-mercantilist structures with which it 
came entwined in practice.  
An illuminating instance of this fraught entanglement of commerce and empire in 
the eighteenth century was the uneasy symbiosis between what Anthony Hopkins and Peter 
Cain have labeled the “gentlemanly capitalists” of the British metropole and what I call the 
“imperial frontiersmen” of Britain’s transoceanic economy.12 The term “frontiersman” is 
only partly metaphorical. Britain’s imperial economy historically rose on the endeavors of 
colonial economic entrepreneurs such as settlers, planters, and joint-stock trading company 																																																								
10 See, among others, R. Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 
1492-1800 (London, 1997); Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and 
Exploitation (Leiden: Brill, 2010); A. Bagchi, Perilous Passage: Mankind and the Global Ascendancy of 
Capital (Lanham, 2005); A. Bagchi, “Nineteenth Century Imperialism and Structural Transformation in 
Colonized Countries” in H. Akram-Lodhi and C. Kay (eds), Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, 
Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question (London, 2009); M. Kale, The Fragments of Empire: 
Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration to the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting Colonial Politics of 
Recognition (Minneapolis, 2014). 
11 S. Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism (London, 2015), p. 37. 
12 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old Colonial 
System, 1688-1850,’ The Economic History Review, 39 (1986) pp. 501-25; A. Porter, ‘Gentlemanly 
Capitalism and Empire: The British Experience Since 1750?’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 18 (1990) pp. 265-95. 
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agents. As H. V. Bowen notes, the gentlemanly capitalists of the Cain-Hopkins thesis who 
were committed to overseas expansion themselves never left Britain; “the real drivers were 
those operating at or beyond different frontiers.”13 These “real drivers” were the ones who 
got their hands dirty, so to speak, in the making of global commerce: on the Western 
frontier, building plantations with Native American land and African slave labor in the 
Caribbean and Virginia; on the Eastern frontier, reorienting by means of arms and fraud 
the economy of the Indian Ocean to the European and Atlantic markets.14  
Imperial frontiers comprised a “great testing-ground for the operation of 
commerce” outside the restrictive institutions, customs, and norms regnant in Britain, 
wherein economic entrepreneurs found unprecedented freedom in devising novel and 
violent forms of exploitation and extraction.15 As a result, however,  
“The East and West Indies were both uncivil societies. One of the revelations of the postwar 
world of the 1760s and 1770s was indeed the discovery, with the East India Company 
Scandals, that the British Empire was a ferment of cruelty and barbarism in the commercial 
“East,” as well as the slave-owning and slave-trading “West.””16  
 
In planters, colonial merchants, and company agents at the far-flung provinces of the 
British Empire, we can see the internal tensions of global commerce magnified. On the one 
hand, these agents were indispensable for breaking new ground for capital investment via 
settler colonies and plantations, and for establishing maritime trade networks through 
which the metropolitan capital circulated and expanded. The British commerce flourished 
																																																								
13 H. V. Bowen, ‘British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756-83,’ The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), pp. 1-27, p. 21. 
14 D. Washbrook, ‘South Asia, the World System, and World Capitalism,’ The Journal of Asian Studies 49 
(1990) pp. 479-508; K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean 
from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990). 
15 A. B. Leonard and D. Pretel, ‘Experiments in Modernity: the Making of the Atlantic World Economy,’ in 
A. B. Leonard and D. Pretel (eds) The Caribbean and the Atlantic World Economy: Circuits of Trade, Money, 
and Knowledge, (Basingstoke, 2015), p. 5. 
16 E. Rothschild, ‘The Atlantic Worlds of David Hume,’ in B. Bailyn and P. L. Denault (eds), Soundings in 
Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, (Cambridge, 2009), p. 442. 
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and its economy diversified thanks to overseas expansion, a point that Hume and Smith, 
along with many of their enlightened contemporaries, openly conceded.17 On the other 
hand, imperial frontiersmen were found to be too cruel in their business methods and crude 
in their social manners to be readily admitted to the circle of Britain’s commercial civility. 
Although the British public and political opinion was not monolithic, it harbored a strain, 
particularly pronounced amongst the men of letters, that deemed colonial entrepreneurs to 
be despotic, rapacious, and barbarous when judged by the metropolitan standards of 
civilization, refinement, and manners. Imperial frontiersmen thereby occupied in the 
British imaginary the peculiar position of the uncivil members of a civil society, consigned 
to the cultural margins of a commercial order that they helped bring about.  
David Hume’s political essays comprise a propitious entry point for unraveling the 
tensions outlined above. Hume’s intellectual career coincided with the turbulent decades 
of imperial expansion, crisis, and reform in the second half of the century encompassing 
the Seven Years’ War, the American crisis, and the militarized incursion of the East India 
Company in India. These developments effected a shift in the British comprehension of 
“empire” from a mere collection of disconnected possessions to an economic totality of 
interdependent peripheries that ought to be deliberately integrated and governed by 
policy.18 Hume held profound misgivings about the way the British Empire was governed 
in his day, above all, about the dangers posed by imperial expansion for Britain’s economic 
																																																								
17 A. Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R. H. Campbell and A. S. 
Skinner (eds.) vol. II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis, 
1981), Vol. I, p. 65. The positive dynamic between colonial expansion and settlement, on the one hand, and 
enhanced economic performance in the metropole has been traced at least back to the second half of the 
seventeenth century. See S. Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven, 2009); N. Zahedieh, 
Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 (Cambridge, 2010). 
18 Bowen, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism,’ p. 26. See, more broadly, H. V. Bowen, ‘British Conceptions of Global 
Empire, 1756-83,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), pp. 1-27. 
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wellbeing and political institutions.19 As a principal interlocutor in the commercial 
reappraisal of statecraft and empire, he relied heavily on the lexicon of political economy 
and the popular essay form to address his disquisitions about imperial misconduct to a 
metropolitan audience.20 As I elaborate below, Hume’s disquisitions evinced a notable 
tension between his approval of the extension of global commerce and its contribution to 
prosperity, sociability, and civility, and his suspicion of the colonial actors, institutions, 
and dispositions that practically effectuated commercial expansion.21 These tensions came 
to a head around the issue of Atlantic slavery, and Hume, unlike Adam Smith who openly 
confronted the issue, opted for disavowing the connection between colonial slavery and 
global commerce.  
Before we proceed to an examination of Hume’s writings, I should clarify that the 
point of my argument is not to charge Hume with duplicity in obscuring the slavery-
commerce nexus, but to interpret his disavowal as an index to a more general ideological 
tension between capitalism’s illiberal moorings in the world of colonial empires and its 
																																																								
19 This pattern of imperial critique, common to many of Hume’s enlightened contemporaries, has a longer 
genealogy, extending back to the seventeenth-century neo-republican critiques of imperial expansion and 
forward to twentieth-century anxieties over the boomerang effect of empire-building. See D. Armitage, The 
Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge, 2000); A. Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property, and 
Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2014).  
20 According to Istvan Hont, Hume developed one of the earliest attempts to define the advent of modern 
politics by the political attention devoted to commerce. I. Hont, ‘An Introduction,’ in The Jealousy of Trade: 
International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 9, 121-3. 
For a fascinating study of the diffusion of political economy as the lingua franca of statecraft in early-modern 
Europe, see S. Reinert, ‘The Empire of Emulation: A Quantitative Analysis of Economic Translations in the 
European World, 1500-1849,’ in S. Reinert and P. Røge (eds), The Political Economy of Empire in the Early 
Modern World (Basingstoke, 2013). 
21 There exists disagreement over the target of Hume’s skepticism. Pocock holds that for Hume finance and 
public debt were at once the inevitable corollaries of commercial society and the proximate causes of its self-
destruction. Hont disagrees, relocating the source of Hume’s dismay from public debt itself to empire-driven 
wars that inflated it to unsustainable levels. J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying 
Thoughts of the North Briton,’ in Virtue, Commerce, History: Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1985); I. Hont, ‘The Rhapsody of Public Debt: David Hume 
and Voluntary State Bankruptcy,’ in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds), Political Discourse in Early Modern 
Britain, ed. (Cambridge, 1993). 
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essentially liberal-commercial conceptions in British metropolitan political economy. This 
was arguably a common theoretical problem that faced any eighteenth-century thinker who 
gave serious reflection to the history and workings of the new commercial order. Needless 
to say, the historical instances of this problem varied across specific controversies over 
territorial conquest, settler colonialism, slavery, armed trading, and merchant sovereignty, 
each of which elicited an array of positions ranging from frank admission to uneasy 
disavowal to uncompromising criticism. For instance, Edmund Burke could couple his 
fierce attack on the governance of the India trade with a triumphalist embrace of settler 
colonies in North America, while Adam Smith’s principled critique of colonial slavery 
would fade into disavowal on the issue of the Native American displacement.22 Ultimately, 
whether one cut a liberal role for the British Empire as the global engine of private property, 
free trade, and free labor, or turned these liberal principles into the very basis of denouncing 
imperial practice, the tension at the heart of global commerce persisted as a central issue 
animating the polyvalent discourse of political economy. Hume’s disavowal of colonial 
slavery belongs to this broader story of navigating between commerce and empire, to the 
genealogy of the liberal imaginary of capitalism in the face of its illiberal history. 
 
II. Cosmopolitan Economy and Commercial Civility 
 As has been noted by a number of scholars, Hume was one of the first eighteenth-
century thinkers to make the cornerstone of his reflections the premise that the formation 																																																								
22 On Edmund Burke, see O. Ince, ‘Not A Partnership in Pepper, Coffee, Calico or Tobacco: Edmund Burke 
and the Vicissitudes of Colonial Capitalism,’ Polity, 44 (2012), pp. 340-372; D. Bell, ‘The Dream Machine: 
On Liberalism and Empire,’ in Reordering the World: Essays on Liberalism and Empire (Princeton, 2016); 
D. O’Neill, Edmund Burke and the Conservative Logic of Empire (Berkeley, 2016). On Adam Smith, see 
David Williams, ‘Adam Smith and Colonialism,’ Journal of International Political Theory 10 (2014), pp. 
283-301; O. Ince, ‘Adam Smith, Settler Colonialism, and Cosmopolitan Overstretch,’ paper presented at the 
2016 Annual Conference of the Association for Political Theory. 
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of global networks of commerce had forever changed the parameters of politics in 
Europe.23 In “Of Civil Liberty,” he remarked 
trade was never esteemed an affair of state till the last century; and there is scarcely any 
ancient writer of politics, who has made mention of it. … The great opulence, grandeur, 
and military achievements of the two maritime powers [the United Dutch Provinces and 
Great Britain] seem first to have instructed mankind in the importance of an extensive 
commerce.”24 
 
“European history had become the history of commerce,”25 and Hume’s speculations on 
the principles of government “were to a substantial extent the principles of government of 
economic connections … of the new circumstances of global commerce.”26 The cluster of 
political, legal, ethical, and economic themes that coalesced into the language of political 
economy were reflected in what Emma Rothschild has labeled Hume’s commercial “idyll.” 
In Hume’s essays “Of Commerce” and “Of Refinement in the Arts,” commerce 
consistently occupied the center of a semantic constellation comprising prosperity, peace, 
sociability, learning, arts, and sciences. As Richard Boyd puts is concisely, Hume belonged 
to the eighteenth-century intellectual coterie who conceived “‘civil society’ as the moral 
antonym of ‘barbarism’; ‘civilization’ as the broader description of Enlightenment; 
commerce as the most likely engine of this transformation; and ‘civility’ as the distinctive 
virtue associated with the social conditions of and extended economic order.”27 While 
Hume neither elaborated on the specific causal mechanisms by which commerce brought 
																																																								
23 Hont, ‘An Introduction’; C. Wennerlind, ‘David Hume’s Political Philosophy: A Theory of Commercial 
Modernization,’ Hume Studies, 28 (2002), pp. 247-70; C. Cheney, ‘Constitution and Economy in David 
Hume’s Enlightenment,’ M. Schabas and C. Wennerlind (eds), David Hume’s Political Economy (New York, 
2008). 
24 D. Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), p. 67. 
25 Cheney, ‘Constitution and Economy,’ p. 223 
26 Rothschild, ‘Atlantic Worlds,’ p. 413. 
27 R. Boyd, ‘Manners and Morals: David Hume on Civility, Commerce, and the Social Construction of 
Difference,’ in Schabas and Wennerlind (eds), David Hume’s Political Economy, p. 65. For an excellent 
treatment of the Scottish Enlightenment interpretation of “commercial society,” see C. Berry, Social Theory 
of the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1997), especially pp. 120-155. 
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about these advances of civilization, nor seemed to propose commercial society as a 
universal terminus of social development to which all societies were inevitably drawn,28 
he left little doubt that he thought commerce and civility to be closely tethered. Commerce, 
by introducing human beings to different commodities, especially of the refined and 
luxurious kind, incited in them new desires, rousing them from indolence into industry, 
giving new vigor to their mental faculties, and promoting liberal as well as mechanical arts, 
linking “industry, knowledge, and humanity” together with an “indissoluble chain.”29 
The element of “humanity” followed from the refinement of human reason by its 
application to the “vulgar arts” of “commerce and industry” and the concomitant 
stabilization of passions by their exteriorization.30 The process of “refinement” in turn 
carried two key social and political corollaries. The first was the gradual softening of 
tempers and broadening of sensibilities entailed (and necessitated) by increasingly complex 
relations of economic interdependence mediated by market transactions. This new model 
of social cohesion, of “unsocial sociability,”31 made it possible to relate to strangers in a 
peaceful and even enjoyable manner. In a commercial society, people “flock into cities; 
love to receive and communicate knowledge” in direct contrast to the distance, isolation, 
																																																								
28 See, Wennerlind ‘David Hume’s Political Philosophy.’ In “Of Money” and “Of the Balance of Trade,” 
Hume asserts that industry and prosperity are a function of the “manners and customs of the people,” noting 
that monetary and trade policy can promote economic performance only indirectly effecting these social 
dispositions. Hume, Essays, pp. 175, 193. Similarly, he contrasts the customs and institutions of republics 
with those of monarchies and concludes the former to be more favorable to commerce. Hum, Essays, pp. 85-
6. For a discussion of Hume’s thoughts on the connection between regime type and commercial dynamism, 
see Cheney, ‘Constitution and Economy.’ 
29 Hume, Essays, p.164. 
30 See J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The Mobility of Property and the Emergence of Eighteenth Century Sociology,’ in 
Virtue, Commerce, History. 
31 For a meticulous reconstruction of the idea of unsociable sociability in the early-modern period, see I. 
Hont, ‘The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of 
the ‘Four-Stages Theory,’’ in A. Pagden (ed) The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe 
(Cambridge, 1987). 
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and mutual suspicion that typified relations between “ignorant and barbarous nations”32 – 
in one word, social interaction became more civil. The second corollary is political. 
Sociability and refined manners of a civil society also engendered “mildness and 
moderation” in government by “instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims 
above rigour and severity” and habituating them into submission to “laws, order, police, 
discipline.”33 An unintended consequence of commerce was to render individuals more 
governable through consensual, pacific means, making possible civil government in which 
people remained free even as they voluntarily submitted to public authority. 
Importantly, the conditions of commercial civility were not an immediate function 
of political constitutions. Breaking with the long-standing dichotomy between republics 
and monarchies, Hume envisioned the possibility of commercial society under both forms 
of government. Notwithstanding certain critical differences between the two constitutions 
(detailed below), the “civilized monarchies” of Europe were for Hume “government of 
Laws, not of Men” and thereby quite capable of securing property, encouraging industry, 
and promoting manufactures and commerce.34 Instead, the contrasting cases by which 
Hume cast commercial civility in relief were, on the one hand, ancient Greek and Roman 
republics that combined a disorderly and warlike spirit of liberty with the most cruel form 
of slavery, and on the other, Asiatic despotisms of Turkey and India in which political order 
																																																								
32 Hume, Essays, p. 164. 
33 Ibid., p. 166. 
34 Hume, Essays, p. 70. Also see Cheney, ‘Constitution and Economy.’ The shift in the discussion of liberty 
away from republican forms and checks and balances towards the security of person and property was more 
broadly part and parcel of eighteenth-century political economy. Other luminaries of this nascent field, like 
James Steuart and Adam Smith, echoed Hume’s distinction. See for instance, R. Travers, ‘British India as a 
Problem of Political Economy: Comparing James Steuart and Adam Smith,’ D. Kelly (ed), Lineages of 
Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought (Oxford, 2009); D. Winch, Riches and Poverty: 
An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge, 1996). 
  14	
was maintained through arbitrary power over servile masses.35 While Hume’s enlightened 
contemporaries diverged on the existence, extent, or exceptionalism of “despotism” in 
Asia, their agreement over the fundamental differences between the ancient and the modern 
Europeans was more complete.36 Eighteenth-century language of commercial civility often 
compared ancient republics to modern-day barbarians, like Central Asian pastoralists or 
Native American hunter and gatherers, yet this “reevaluation of the ancient city-state 
tradition from a modernist point of view” represented “a downgrading of the ancients rather 
than an upgrading of the primitives.”37 For instance, Hume spoke of the Romans as the 
“only uncivilized people that ever possessed military discipline,”38 and he demonstrated 
their profound unsociability by noting, “in the old Latin, the term hostis expressed both a 
stranger and an enemy.”39 In doing so, he was partaking in the broader proclivity to cast 
the ancient Europeans and contemporary non-Europeans as “barbarous” in their social 
manners and modes of government precisely because they occupied a “pre-commercial” 
station in the stadial history of human development. In these societies, Pocock writes, “the 
exchange of goods and services is so underdeveloped that the normal human relationship 
																																																								
35 For Hume’s criticisms of the irregular government of the ancients, see principally “Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations,” in Hume, Essays, especially pp. 231-4. For similar reflections on Oriental despotism, see 
“Of Taxes,” in Hume, Essays, p. 204. 
36 Eighteenth century European literati harbored quite a number of “Orientalists” like John Wilson, Anquetil-
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37 F. Whelan, ‘Hume and the Non-Western World,’ in Enlightenment Thought, p. 16. 
38 Hume, Essays, p. 166. 
39 Hume, Essays, p. 376, n8. Hume maintained a similar approach to ancient Greek politics, which he deemed 
to be “violent, and contrary to the more natural and usual course of things.” Hume 1987: 157. 
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is between master and slave, lord and serf. Only as commerce develops do social relations 
become capable of generating civil authority.”40 
It is thereby unsurprising that Hume was also one of the first defenders of global 
free trade, although his own term, “open communication” better captures the multifaceted 
nature of commerce beyond the mere exchange of commodities.41 The cosmopolitan bent 
of Hume’s thought at times bordered on the teleological, as when he wrote in “Of The 
Jealousy of Trade,” “[n]ature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates, and soils, to 
different nations, has secured their mutual intercourse and commerce, as long as they all 
remain industrious and civilized.”42 Pursued as principle and policy, free trade would set 
in motion a mutually reinforcing relationship between domestic economic growth and 
foreign commerce through competitive “emulation” or “imitation of foreigners” in their 
superior “art, industry, and invention.”43 Nor were the rewards to global commerce to be 
engrossed by a minority. “There seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human 
affairs,” Hume wrote in “Of Money,” “which checks the growth of trade and riches, and 
hinders them from being confined entirely to one people.”44 Hume developed a theory of 
limited economic convergence based on relative labor costs and capital mobility, in which 
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44 Ibid., p. 170 
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the discrepancy in wage levels (themselves a function of differential prosperity) would 
prompt capital and industry to migrate from rich countries to poor ones and contribute to 
the their prosperity.45 For Hume, “the argument became the cornerstone of a cosmopolitan 
theory of commercial globalization,” a prefiguration of the “competitive advantage” as a 
mechanism that could “spread economic development from the center to the peripheries.”46 
If “open communication” was allowed to run its natural course, the dynamics of trade, 
money, factor mobility, and division of labor would conspire in favor of commerce and 
civility, peace and prosperity, industry and happiness.  
The “if” in the last sentence, however, is a momentous one. Global commerce in 
the second half of the eighteenth-century was anything but idyllic, and Hume knew it. Like 
William Robertson and Adam Smith would after him, he welcomed the “the discovery of 
new worlds, by which commerce has been so much enlarged.”47 Yet as he was well aware, 
the institutional framework within which webs of commerce emerged and bound Europe 
to the East and West Indies was one of colonial empires. This was a world of mercantilist 
monopolies, privileges, and protectionism, of slave trade and plantations, and of inter-
imperial rivalry that frequently erupted into drawn-out wars.  
Despite this imperial salience, however, Hume’s reflections on empire remained 
intermittent and elliptical. For instance, Frederick Whelan notes the palpable inattention in 
these reflections to the “Indian, and the larger South Asian scene,” while Glen Doris 
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highlights Hume’s notable silence on the question of colonial slavery.48 As I discuss in the 
next section, Hume’s reticence on modern slavery stands out even more starkly when 
juxtaposed to his verbose and unfavorable treatment of the ancient institution of slavery. 
These omissions are all the more striking because, as diligently detailed by Rothschild and 
Ian Simpson Ross, Hume’s biography is a story thick with imperial connections. Hume 
himself had a brief mercantile career in 1734 as a clerk in the house of a Bristol merchant 
at a time when Bristol was at the height of its grandeur as a commercial hub in the colonial 
trade of slaves, sugar, and tobacco.49 More broadly, Hume’s native Scotland sent out a 
significant contingent of entrepreneurs both to the West and the East Indies, including a 
number of Hume’s friends and acquaintances who were “connected, directly or indirectly, 
to the Atlantic slave economy.”50  
In other words, Hume was steeped in a world of transoceanic commerce that was 
bookended by, on the one hand, wealth in “plantations and slaves and mills and boiling 
houses” to the West, and on the other, fortunes made in “jewels or bonds or “paper”” to 
the East.51 Yet, we do not find in Hume’s political essays a systematic treatment of empire 
that reflects the density of imperial economic relations that stamped his social and personal 
milieu. Reconstructing such an account requires extrapolating from Hume’s scattered 
remarks on commerce, slavery, despotism, and liberty, themes that he articulated through 
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comparisons between the ancients and the moderns, and between the Europeans and the 
non-Europeans. I maintain that even when Hume seemed to confine his discussion of 
commerce and civility to examples outside of modern Europe, it is possible to discern in 
these discussions the imprint of imperial economies that shaped his context. The next two 
sections trace this imprint around the questions of trade monopoly and slavery. 
 
III. Imperial Worlds of Global Commerce 
 It can be argued that Hume’s neglect of militarized trading operations in India was 
due to the fact that the “scandal of empire”52 in the East had not yet been exposed when he 
published his essays in Political Discourses in 1752 – though the question remains why he 
did not produce a tract on the subject when the delinquency of the East India Company in 
Bengal garnered public attention in the 1760s and 1770s and drew Edmund Burke into one 
of the most dramatic castigations of imperial abuse. Nonetheless, Hume’s general position 
on the imperial system of trade was unequivocal. Prefiguring the classical political 
economy’s catholic criticism of the “old colonial system,”53 he decried the “monopolies of 
our East India companies obstructing communication,” opposed the duties levied on 
foreign imports designed to “encourage home manufactures” or “support our southern 
colonies,” and ridiculed the folly of imperial wars driven by the “jealousy of trade” by 
comparing them to “a match of cudgel-playing fought in a China shop.”54 His essay “Of 
Money,” where he elaborated his famous “specie-flow mechanism,” principally aimed at 
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demonstrating the futility of mercantilist policies of balance of trade in a world of global 
economic connections, and eventually inspired Adam Smith’s sweeping critique of the 
“mercantile system.”55 
In The History of England, Hume extended the economic argument into the political 
and equated Elizabethan policy of trade monopolies with despotic Turkish system of 
taxation. He concluded that “had [Elizabeth] gone on, during a track of years, at her own 
rate, England, the seat of riches, and arts, and commerce, would have contained at present 
as little industry as Morocco, or the coast of Barbary.”56 Of particular concern to Hume 
was the expansion of British public credit to unprecedented levels in order to support 
imperial wars. In “Of Public Credit,” Hume inventively imbued the eighteenth-century 
civic humanist critique of imperial over-extension with a political economic content, 
alerting his readers to the corrosive effects of public debt on domestic institutions and 
customs that could end in nothing short of the destruction of liberty and the establishment 
of the basest form of despotism.57 And generalizing from the fall of the Roman empire, 
which he attributed not to “luxury” but to “an ill-modeled government, and the unlimited 
extent of conquests,” he concluded “extensive conquests, when pursued, must be the ruin 
of every free government.”58 The policy of channeling the wealth of the nation, through 																																																								
55 Jacob Viner has popularized the term “specie-flow mechanism” into a staple of modern economic debate. 
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taxation, monopoly, or public debt, into pursuing imperial bellicosity was, as the analogy 
with the Turks and the Romans suggest, was a most unenlightened and barbarous policy. 
These arguments lend credence to Whelan’s conclusion, “Hume’s endorsement of free 
international trade seems not to have embraced the kind of intrusive and aggressive policies 
… that sometimes amounted to what can be termed commercial imperialism.”59  
Beyond this, however, Hume had little to say about alternative institutional 
arrangements for enabling transoceanic commerce that could replace the extant 
mercantilist policies. The known, actual history of global commerce that separated the 
moderns from the ancients had been inaugurated by European overseas expansion, replete 
with territorial conquest, Native American and African enslavement, and resource 
extraction. Once in place, these political and economic arrangements had been 
institutionalized in the form of colonial charters, monopolies, and slave codes. In the words 
of Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “coercion and military violence went hand in hand 
with trading enterprises,” which “played key roles in creating global marketplace linkages 
rather than thwarting connections.”60 This point was not lost on eighteenth-century 
defenders of the British East India Company, like Julius Mickle who derided Smith’s vision 
of free trade with the East Indies as little more than a speculative chimera.61 As to what 
would succeed this coercive system as the institutional mainstay of global commerce, 
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Hume had no clear answer. In justice to Hume, he was not alone in stopping short of 
proposing an alternative to the mercantilist structures. As Patrick O’Brien reminds us, 
very few critics of mercantilism and imperialism writing between 1688 and 1815 
developed an alternative blueprint for national development. … Nearly everyone at the 
time perceived that economic progress, national security, and the integration of the 
kingdom might well come from sustained levels of investment in global commerce, naval 
power, and, whenever necessary, the acquisition of bases and territories overseas.62 
 
The most intuitive solution to the economically liberal mind would be to abolish 
imperial institutions and let transoceanic commerce chart its spontaneous course. Yet, as 
Istvan Hont correctly observes, neither Hume nor Smith after him “cared to speculate about 
a pure realm of trade that operated in peace and harmony.”63 One explanation for this is 
the fact that international free trade would be unviable by the terms of Hume’s own theory 
of commerce. Hume posited a set of enabling conditions that had to be in place for 
commercial relations to take root yet that were markedly absent at the international level. 
As Carl Wennerlind argues, Hume conceived of commercial society as a contingent social 
formation dependent on “certain conventions,” internalized as “artificial virtues,” that 
would direct the passions and self-love of individuals toward virtuous ends.64 Wennerlind 
identifies “property,” “markets,” and “money” as the “constitutive institutions of a modern 
commercial society” in Hume’s account. These institutions historically emerged through 
an evolutionary process in which the “middling sorts” (social classes positioned between 
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great landlords and laboring masses) played a decisive role, and in which compliance from 
the dissenters to the new social order was secured through a coercive system of laws.65  
This interpretation of commercial society as contingent on the happy confluence of 
several historical factors that solidified into a structure of custom and law finds support in 
Hume’s assessment on the relative capacities of republics and monarchies in generating 
commercial civility. In “Of the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences,” Hume reserved 
this auto-generative capacity exclusively for “free governments,” which inevitably tended 
towards a system of laws and security that made the pursuit of arts, sciences, and learning 
both a feasible and an honorable activity. By contrast, monarchies, insofar as they rested 
on the untrammeled prerogative of the sovereign and his petty tyrants, ranked utterly 
incapable of autonomous development of commercial civility.66 It was a contradiction to 
expect, Hume wrote, “that a pure despotism established among a barbarous people, can 
ever, by its native force and energy, refine and polish itself. It must borrow its laws, 
methods, and institutions, and consequently its stability and order, from free governments. 
These advantages are the sole growth of republics.”67 At best, monarchies could emulate 
the achievements of free governments and thereby evolve into Hume’s “civilized 
monarchies,” as in Bourbon France. Even then, the stagnation of the Asiatic despotisms 
indicated that such emulation was by no means a foregone conclusion. 
 Crucially, when it came to global commerce, Hume offered no corresponding 
account of conventions, customs, and system of laws that could render social intercourse 
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polite and mutually beneficial and restrict rivalry to peaceful emulation. In the absence of 
such institutional conditions, there was no reason to expect that abandoning the old colonial 
system, even if it were at all possible, would clear the way for a pacific order of 
international trade. A comparison with Adam Smith here might be illustrative. The 
conundrum that confronted Hume also, and perhaps more starkly, vexed Adam Smith, who 
amplified and systematized Hume’s anti-imperial free trade argument. Smith excoriated 
joint-stock trading companies and the allied faction of metropolitan merchants, criticized 
chattel slavery, and prescribed either decolonization or imperial federation as the only 
possible remedies to the injuries of empire.68 Yet, for all his intellectual investment and 
acumen, Smith’s analysis also stopped short of designating a cosmopolitan alternative to 
Britain’s imperial system. Smith and Hume can be said to have come up against the same 
problem of what Rothschild calls the “political conditions for the flourishing of free trade.” 
“[L]ong-distance commerce,” Rothschild remarks, “required at least one of three sorts of 
“order” if it was to be tolerably secure.”69 These were, first, entrusting the protection and 
enforcement of economic transactions to local authorities in distant lands; second, relying 
on the existing methods of military and political instruments of empire; and, third, a 
transoceanic institutional framework that would straddle the political borders of the states 
engaged in commerce. The difficulty of Smith’s system (and one can plausibly add Hume 
here) was that he “[did] not choose any of these three possible orders.”70 In the absence of 
such a viable alternative, for Hume or Smith to expect that global commerce could 
somehow shed the cocoon of empire in which it imperceptibly incubated, and then replicate 
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at the global level the commercial civility that obtained within Britain, was a tremendous 
leap of faith, one that would be paralleled only by Karl Marx’s derivation of universal 
human emancipation from the exploitation and iniquities of capitalism a century later. 71 
 Perhaps more significant than the question of political conditions of international 
trade was the move to disentangle the very notion of “commerce” from the thick of the 
history of colonial dispossession and bondage, and to posit empire as a threat to, rather 
than the enabling underside of, global commerce. I suggest that the feat of distilling a 
pacific and civilizing essence of commerce from the sordid reality of imperial economies 
of slavery and extraction required underplaying, eliding, or to use Jeanne Morefield’s 
felicitous term, “deflecting” attention away from the most egregious aspects of early-
modern global commodity chains.72 Such deflection need not serve imperial justification, 
and Hume can hardly be credited as a defender of empire. Yet, regardless of its animating 
motives, pitting the promise of cosmopolitan commerce against the violence of empire 
involved a conceptual purification that expunged the imperial baggage of global 
commerce, such that it could stand as the antithesis of empire.73 I contend that Hume’s 
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writings on slavery constitute the primary site of such deflection wherein he drew attention 
to the barbarism and incivility of slavery only to instantly turn attention away from its 
colonial form by confining his study of this institution to the ancient Greek and Roman 
cases. Even if we were to admit Hume’s writings on Ancient slavery as a veiled criticism 
of modern slavery, this remained a distinctly moral and political criticism that revolved 
around on despotism and the corruption of character, and avoided the socioeconomic 
register of commerce, capital, and public economy. Consequently, the profound incivility 
that pervaded the central node of Atlantic commerce, that is, the slave societies of the 
British West Indian frontier, was kept at arm’s length from the gentlemanly capitalism and 
commercial civility of the metropole. 
 
IV. Colonial Slavery and Commercial Incivility 
In 1713, Daniel Defoe had unceremoniously expressed the critical importance of 
slave trade to Britain’s Atlantic commerce: “No African Trade, no Negroes, no Negroes, 
no Sugar; no Sugar no Islands, no Islands no Continent, no Continent no Trade; that is to 
say farewell your American Trade, your West Indian Trade.”74 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, this economic argument sedimented into a sort of truism, as reflected, for instance, 
in Edmund and William Burke’s An Account of the European Settlements in America 
(1757) where the authors wrote “[n]othing could excuse slave trade at all, but the necessity 
we are under of peopling our colonies, and the consideration that the slaves but were in the 
same condition in Africa.”75 The moral unease in the Burkes’ passage, however, signals a 
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shift in attitudes around this time, namely, the emergence in the British Isles a “secular 
critique” of West Indian slavery articulated in the language of “civility and barbarism, 
virtue and savagery.”76 Given Hume’s germinal contribution to the secular language of 
civility, it is striking to find that he had little to say about the slave trade and plantation 
system in the British colonies. This paucity of overt reference to modern slavery has lead 
one commentator to conclude, “Hume delicately avoids declaring that modern slavery is 
as morally debasing to the British society as he believes it was to the inhabitants of the 
classical world.”77 I contend, however, that if we read Hume’s treatment of ancient slavery 
like a palimpsest and place it in conversation with Smith’s remarks on colonial slavery, we 
can detect the contours of Hume’s Atlantic context and catch a glimpse into the modern 
conundrum of “commercial incivility.” 
Hume’s most extensive reflections on the subject of slavery are to be found in his 
essay, “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations.” In that tract, Hume departed from the 
postulate, “there is no universal difference discernible in the human species,” and attributed 
variation in social manners to conventions, institutions, and historical circumstance.78 He 
substantiated this postulate through a comparison of the ancient and the moderns on their 
domestic and political institutions in which slavery occupied the central place. “The chief 
difference between the domestic oeconomy of the ancients and that of the moderns,” Hume 
wrote, “consists in the practice of slavery which prevailed among the former, and which 
has been abolished for some centuries throughout the greater part of Europe.”79 Following 
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the influence of institutions on manners, Hume conjectured that the “severe, I might say, 
barbarous manners of ancient times” was due to “the practice of domestic slavery; by which 
every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant, and educated amidst the flattery, 
submission, and low debasement of his slaves.”80 Absence of slavery in modern Europe, 
by contrast, rendered even the “most arbitrary government” preferable to the “the most 
flourishing period of ancient times.”81 When Hume, as a “polite man of commercial and 
cultivated society,” looked back to the antiquity, what he saw was “not a world of virtuous 
citizens but one of barbarism.”82 
Punctuating this otherwise predictably adverse assessment of ancient slavery were 
two instances where colonial slavery made an oblique appearance in the essay. The first of 
these was Hume’s acknowledgment of the “domestic slavery, in the American colonies,” 
which, however, he quickly allayed by assuring that its limited scope “would never surely 
create the desire of rendering it more universal.”83 The second, even more oblique, 
reference to modern slavery was in a footnote on the demographic decline of slave 
populations due to ill-treatment, on which Hume wrote, “[i]t is computed in the West 
Indies, that a stock of slaves grow [sic.] worse five per cent. every year, unless new slaves 
be bought to recruit them.”84 In the same footnote, he also proposed what would become 
the staple liberal economic argument against slavery, namely, the economic inefficiency 
of slave labor due to high costs of maintaining slaves and low productivity of their labor. 
Hume reiterated this point more catholically by pronouncing, “slavery is in general 
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disadvantageous both to the happiness and populousness of mankind, and that its place is 
much better supplied by the practice of hired servants.”85 
While these arguments lend support to the conclusion that “Hume was apparently 
sincerely distressed by the institution of slavery,” his remarkable evasion of the issue of 
colonial slavery leaves open the question of whether he wanted to see the practice 
abolished. One way to explain this differential treatment of the ancient and the modern 
slavery is to consider the fundamentally different social purposes they served. Ancient 
slavery, as Hume underscored, belonged to the domestic sphere of the private economy, 
the realm of oikonomia outlined in Aristotle’s Politics. As Pocock notes, the main function 
of property in slaves was to give the ancient citizen of virtue “independence and autonomy 
as well as the leisure and liberty to engage in public affairs.”86 Modern colonial slavery, in 
contrast, was rooted in the public economy of a decisively commercial kind. A West Indian 
planter was not so much the paterfamilias ruling over a household as a commercial 
entrepreneur exercising “quasi-feudal powers” over an “army of labor” exploited for 
export-oriented agriculture.87 As Sidney Mintz, Robin Blackburn, and Hilary Beckles, 
among others, have demonstrated, modern slavery, both in its black-chattel and white-
indentured forms, found its propulsive power in the expanding webs of transoceanic trade 
and capital accumulation in the Atlantic. Modern plantation slavery was thereby anything 
but an atavistic residue of ancient or feudal forms of bondage.88 It was the progeny and a 
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vital part of global commerce that had made possible the advancement of modern European 
civilization beyond the barbarism of ancient Europeans and contemporary non-Europeans. 
What is more, a significant section of the “middling rank of men,” who now aspired to the 
gentlemanly ideal and whom Hume hailed as the “best and firmest basis of public liberty,” 
made their fortunes directly or indirectly by colonial trade in the West as well as in the 
East.89 
These subterranean and disturbing links can offer an explanation as to why Hume 
treaded so lightly on the question of modern slavery, and ensconced his moral and political 
critique of it in the safety of ancient history. For while colonial slavery was distinctly 
modern in its historical origins and socioeconomic functions, it carried the same odium of 
barbarism that Hume imputed to ancient slavery. As Rotshchild puts it baldly, “America 
was an uncivil society.”90 Colonial planters strove hard to combat this opprobrium by 
projecting an image of gentility that came with landownership and control of dependent 
labor, yet such projection was blemished by the brutality on which their wealth and status 
rested.91 As Catherine Hall puts it, “the wealthy planters represented forms of vulgarity, 
backwardness, and degeneracy that inverted the standards of English civility and culture”; 
the West Indies represented in the British imagination “a kind of outpost of the metropolis, 
an extension or perhaps an excrescence of the British self rather than a place entirely 
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separate.”92 Similarly, Michael Craton encapsulates the ideological tensions of the West 
Indian plantocracy when he notes that while the “contradictions between landowning and 
commerce” were becoming more reconcilable in the first half of the eighteenth century, 
few were able to bridge the gap between the conditions of English rural life and the crude 
realities of slave plantation production. Conversely, few persons with the kind of 
background or temperament that made it possible to exploit Negroes as chattel laborers in 
the cause of profit, could effectively make the transition to English country gentleman.93 
 
Much controversy has been fanned by Hume’s racist statement in “Of National Characters” 
that he suspected “negroes to be naturally inferior to whites. There scarcely ever was a 
civilized nation of that complexion.”94 What Hall and Craton suggest, however, is that the 
colonial masters of negroe slaves also fell short of fulfilling the conditionalities of civility, 
locked in as they were in a barbarizing yet essentially commercial institution that corrupted 
them into petty tyrants. 
 While Hume reserved the barbarism of slavery for the ancient citizens, Asiatic 
despots, and feudal lords,95 there is one striking statement in his essay “That Politics May 
be Reduced to a Science” that can be interpreted to hint at the barbarous proclivities of 
colonial slavery. In that essay, Hume wrote “[I]t may be easily observed, that, though free 
governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom; 
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yet are they the most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces.”96 Arguing that republics 
are more vicious than monarchies towards alien peoples they have subjugated, Hume 
clinched his case with a reference to the cruel tyranny of the Roman Empire “over the 
world during the time of their commonwealth,” which “became easier upon the provinces” 
after the collapse of the republic.97 “If we pass from ancient to modern times,” he 
continued, “we shall still find the observation to hold. The provinces of absolute 
monarchies are always better treated than of the free states.”98 This time, the examples he 
adduced to the argument were the conquered territories of Britain and France. Given that 
he composed this essay during the War of Austrian Succession, a major imperial war that 
was fought as much in North American and Indian theaters as in Europe, one could 
plausibly expect Hume to compare British and French settler colonies and trading posts. 
Instead of America and India, however, one finds Ireland and Corsica.99  
Hume’s omission of overseas colonies from his examination of provincial tyranny 
is cast into sharper relief if one turns to Smith’s discussion of the same theme.  In the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith made almost exactly the same argument about free government 
and provincial oppression, but he did so by comparing the condition of slaves owned by 
the British and the French planters in the West Indies. “[I]n the good management of their 
slaves,” Smith observed, “the French planters … are superior to the English.”100 The reason 
behind this counter-intuitive conclusion was that property rights in slaves were protected 
more stringently under a free government (as in English colonies) in which “the master is 
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perhaps either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member,” whereas 
under arbitrary government (as in French colonies), “it is much easier for [the magistrate] 
to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity disposes him to do so.”101 
While a discussion of Smith’s position of slavery exceeds the scope of this paper, it is 
worth noting that he openly asserted a correlation between economic commercialization 
and social refinement, on the one hand, and the consolidation and increased brutality of 
slavery, on the other. His Lectures on Jurisprudence are littered with the “cruel paradox” 
that “the more wealth, opulence and refinement in a society, the more the misery and 
unhappiness of the slaves.”102 There, Smith variously stated, “in a despotic government, 
slaves may be treated better than in a free government”; “slavery is more tolerable in a 
barbarous than in a civilized society”; “slavery is more severe in proportion to the culture 
of society.”103 The final verdict is 
Opulence and freedom, the two greatest blessings men can possess, tend greatly to the 
misery of this body of men, which in most countries where slavery is allowed makes by far 
the greatest part. A humane man would wish therefore if slavery has to be generally 
established that these greatest blessings, being incompatible with the happiness of the 
greatest part of mankind, were never to take place.104 
 
Although slavery ultimately issued from men’s inherent “love of domination and 
tyrannizing” what made this expensive and inefficient form of labor economically feasible 
in Smith’s day was the artificially high profits that colonial planters reaped thanks to 
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Britain’s mercantile regulations and trade monopolies.105 Smith’s association of 
commerce, opulence, civilization, and culture with more appalling forms of bondage 
clearly suggests that the commercial incivility of the plantation system was far from 
opaque, let alone invisible, to the liberal observer. 
The purpose of contrasting Hume and Smith on the question of slavery is neither to 
idolize Smith, nor to impute Hume any intention of willfully obfuscating the link between 
global commerce and chattel slavery. Rather, given their kindred sensibilities and 
conceptual frameworks on commerce and civilization,106 reading Smith’s remarks on 
slavery alongside those of Hume’s can help detect the evasions where one would expect to 
find explanations, or in Peter Gordon’s words, conjecture about “not just what the author 
said but what she might have said if pressed to consider a further implication or even a 
contradiction of her claims.”107 
 I have sought to answer this question by situating Hume’s writings in the broader 
ideological tension between, on the one hand, conceptions of civility predicated on the 
advent of a modern order of global commerce, and on the other, economic institutions and 
practices that, while integral and enabling parts of global commerce, were deemed uncivil 
and barbarous by the moral standards employed to judge that new order. The figure of the 
“imperial frontiersman” (in this case, the colonial planter) embodies this tension between 
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commerce and empire and offers a productive perspective on the impact of imperial 
economic structures in shaping metropolitan attitudes towards both. In this respect, Hume’s 
disavowal can be understood as a genuine if troubled effort to navigate this contradiction, 
which arose from embracing the prosperity, manners, and morals unique to commercial 
society while refusing to openly engage commercial society’s imperial, illiberal conditions 
of possibility.  
 
Conclusion: From Commerce to Capitalism 
 In an important essay on the historical origins of liberalism, J. G. A. Pocock 
challenged the then-dominant interpretation that traced liberalism to the natural 
jurisprudential theories of Hobbes and Locke.108 Liberalism as a political language, Pocock 
countered, was born of the clash of civic humanism and commercial civility as two modern 
(that is, post-feudal) political vocabularies mobilized to comprehend and judge the 
historical novelty of commercial society in the eighteenth century. Those who spoke the 
language of civic humanism revivified the classical values of citizen virtue and public spirit 
to criticize luxury, finance, and the absorption of citizens into private economic activities 
entailed by the modern division of labor. Exponents of commercial civility, Hume amongst 
them, emphasized the refinement of manners, sociability, and material comforts that 
accompanied increased commercial intercourse, which made the ancient citizen of virtue 
appeared poor, rude, and warlike. The triumph of the language of civility, Pocock 
concludes, is where we should look for liberal origins. 
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I have argued that when we focus on imperial frontiersmen such as colonial 
planters, we find them occupying a liminal position that unsettle the binaries by which 
Hume and other figures of the Enlightenment differentiated modern Europeans from their 
barbarous predecessors as well as from their savage or despotic non-European 
contemporaries. The colonial planter represented a disturbing species of petty tyrant 
residing in imperial provinces who was at once commercial and barbarous, and whose 
barbarism bore a direct proportion to the profits to be made from the exploitation of his 
slaves. Colonial planters were distinctly modern. While partaking in the barbarism of the 
ancients as slave owners, they lacked the latter’s civic virtue. Their property in land and 
slaves were productive assets, or capital, put to the pecuniary pursuit of supplying the 
Atlantic world with tobacco and sugar, rather than a means to independence, autonomy, 
and leisure necessary to engage in public affairs. They were despotic and oppressive in 
their manners like the Asiatics but they were also white, English-speaking subjects of the 
most “enlightened” and “free” nation in Europe. Their barbarism could not be localized 
either temporally or geographically. They inhabited the frontier of commercial civility, 
contributing to its socioeconomic foundations, while being denied full admission in it. 
 Colonial planters are not the only figures that fall under the rubric of imperial 
frontiersman. As noted earlier, the agents of joint-stock trading companies operating in 
South and Southeast Asia also occupied such a liminal position. Once the commercial 
imperialism of the East India Company in India was laid bare by the Select Committee of 
the Commons in 1781, Edmund Burke (one of the members of the Select Committee) 
excoriated the “barbarous policies” of the Company that opened the subcontinent to naked 
plunder with no regard to civilized customs and conventions, British and Indian alike. Once 
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arrived in the Eastern provinces of the empire, Britons dropped all trappings of civility and 
succumbed to a peculating, commercial type of barbarism that rendered them comparable 
to modern-day “Tartars,” who descended on the Indian population like “birds of passage 
and prey.”109 Yet, Burke’s proposed solution was not to pull out of the subcontinent, but to 
restore the Anglo-Indian trade to its “true commercial foundation” while maintaining the 
British rule in India. Burke’s efforts at impeaching Warren Hastings and reform the East 
India Company were tokens of his faith in the possibility of an Indian empire cleansed of 
imperial arrogance, one that remained an empire but conducted fair and equitable trade 
with its conquered subjects, or, to use Morefield’s apt coinage, an empire without 
imperialism. Burke’s exoneration of “imperial commerce” by displacing rapacity onto the 
“imperious commerce” of the Company, like Hume’s confinement of slavery to the 
ancients or the Asiatics, can be construed as an effort to shore up the ideological boundaries 
between commerce and empire at a time when these boundaries were increasingly 
perforated by the movement of planters and company men, along with their colonial wealth 
and incivility, back and forth between the imperial frontiers and the metropole.110 
 To return to the theoretical framework outlined in the first section, an important 
implication of the foregoing analysis is that the “barbarism” that characterized imperial 
frontiersmen represented neither a temporal relapse into more primitive attitudes of cruelty 
nor a spatial exodus from the domain of civility that was coextensive with Western Europe. 
Rather than an anomaly to Western commercial civility, it constituted a dynamic internal 
to the historical emergence of global capitalist relations within the politico-legal framework 
of colonial empires. More specifically, these acts of “barbarism” can be understood as 																																																								
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colonial instances of what Karl Marx has labeled the “primitive accumulation of capital,” 
which denotes the use of extra-economic force, non-market coercion, and naked violence 
for transforming or subordinating non-capitalist relations of reproduction to capital.111 
While primitive accumulation was pivotal to creating the institutional background 
conditions of the capitalist market order, its methods, amongst which Marx includes 
expropriation, enslavement, and plunder, appeared too “primitive” and uncivilized when 
judged by the rarefied image of capitalism as essentially a liberal market society in which 
“life, liberty, property, and Bentham” reigned supreme.112 Expanding these insights into a 
framework of colonial capitalism can bring into focus the inner connections of imperial 
economic formations, the specific vectors of imperial violence employed to transform and 
reorient colonial economies, and the specific ideological problems that each of these 
instances created in specific periods and contexts.  Viewed from this broader perspective, 
the eighteenth-century ambivalence about global commerce ceases to be merely a moral 
critique of wanton imperial violence thwarting a cosmopolitan promise, and appears as a 
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